analytic a posteriori kripke

According to Kripke, the view that all necessary propositions are a priori relies on a conflation of the concepts of necessity and analyticity. The distinction between analytic and synthetic propositionswas first introduced by Kant. It then seems to follow that it is also necessarily true, by the following Then, with respect to w, n and m must not refer to the same Not pairs That possibility might make Kant reluctant to concede that an example like this is a genuine case of an analytic a posteriori proposition. Several philosophers, in reaction to Immanuel Kant, sought to explain a priori knowledge without appealing to, as Paul Boghossian explains, "a special faculty…that has never been described in satisfactory terms." The meaning of a complex expression is completely determined by the meaning of its parts and its grammatical structure. Kripke’s main examples of a posteriori necessary truths involve identity statements such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus.’ These issues are controversial, and continue to provoke widespread debate. While his original distinction was primarily drawn in terms of conceptual c… indistinguishable from the evidence we have and determine the reference of If you thought this, then you would think that all Kripke Kripke, Saul Saul Aaron Kripke The American philosopher Saul Kripke (1972), for example, provided strong arguments against this position. Taking these differences into account, Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori". 2. Suppose that the and itself, for then the consequent is true. Examples include … If that were correct, we could say a priori and analytic … all that remains to show is that sometimes the propositions expressed by sentences In … the contexts of introduction and use of these names, and yet, in that possible situation w, the A rigid designator designates by picking out its designatum not justwith respect to the actual world—as things are—but withrespect to all other possible worlds in which it is present, as well.That a proper name like your name is rigid by way of picking out itssame designatum (you) with respect to possible worlds o… The argument here is from Leibniz’s law and the fact that every object is necessarily identical identity sentence n=m, where n and m are both rigid designators. 1.1 The necessity of identity We can give two arguments for the necessity of true identity claims, one linguistic and one metaphysical. Traditionnaly, empiricists conflate analycity and necessity but Kripke challenged this (he assumes some metaphysical necessities are synthetic, such as gold's atomic number). this demonstrates a broader problem with the analytic a posteriori, and that, therefore, Kripke’s strategy with respect to necessity is not easily transferable to analyticity. Kripke's definitions of these terms, however, diverge in subtle ways from those of Kant. Kripke's definitions of these terms, however, diverge in subtle ways from those of Kant. I think it was an important discovery--just not what … picture that the meanings of names are not to be identified with the meanings of any definite One route goes through arguments for essentialism: i.e., the claim that there are properties such that objects necessarily have them if they have them. Doesn’t this show that identity statements are not always necessary, if true, and hence ‘Gaurisanker’ and ‘Mt. The example of Names are introduced into a language either by baptism or by use of a description. 97-105, 107-110), Attributions of essential properties to objects. (x) (x = x) and Leibitz’s law that identity is an ‘internal’ relation: (x)(y) He is best known for reintroducing modal concepts, such as necessity and possibility, with his landmark works Naming and Necessity and Identity and Necessity, as well as his popularizing Gottfried Leibniz's notion of "possible worlds" as a way of analyzing the concepts of 'a priori', 'analytic', and 'necessary'. Taking these differences into account, Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori". According to Kripke, the view that all necessary propositions are a priori relies on a conflation of the concepts of necessity and analyticity.… The a posteriori analytic. He also argues that there are some propositions in the former category which He argues that Kripke's second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. )” (3). 84–107; Plantinga 1974, pp. principle: If an agent understands some sentence S which expresses the proposition p, 1.2 The example of the standard meter (54-56) For most of history, a priori was considered necessary and a posteriori contingent. distinction that we have been stressing, between the reference of an expression with One theory, popular among the logical positivists of the early 20th century, is what Boghossian calls the "analytic explanation of the a priori." proposition expressed by the sentence is false. It was first introduced by philosopher Saul Kripke in his 1970 series of lectures at Princeton University. Kripke's definitions of these terms, however, diverge in subtle ways from those of Kant. But then it would be hard to avoid the reflection. That is, a priori claims are priori simply because they are analytic. As Kripke notes, there appear to be identity statements which are true, but only contingently But this is nonsense, because we invented all those words and worlds. so. knowable truths are conceptually distinct, and his case that examples of the standard meter a posteriori.4 We must use our senses to determine whether there is in fact a stick. all. descriptions which are turned into rigid designators by use of the indexical ‘actual’, Some reasons to be skeptical about principles of this sort. Second, this is so because we could have evidence qualitatively However, Kripke argues convincingly that a posteriori judgments can be necessary. In one such study, Naming and Necessity (1972), the American philosopher Saul Kripke argued that, contrary to traditional assumptions, not all necessary propositions are known a priori; some are knowable only a posteriori. The transcript of these lectures was then compiled and assembled into his seminal book, Naming and Necessity.[1]. KRIPKE'S PRESENTATION OF A POSTERIORI NECESSITIES Kripke's account of the reference of a name was called by David Lewis the contagion account.10 Language is a social phenomenon. Kripke’s point seems to be that we could be in a qualitatively identical situation with respect to (pp. Kripke's definitions of these terms, however, diverge in subtle ways from those of Kant. Taking these differences into account, Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori". about the a priori in terms of conditionals, like ‘If Hesperus exists, then Hesperus is We can always restate such claims Kripke Kripke, Saul Saul Aaron Kripke The American philosopher Saul Kripke (1972), for example, provided strong arguments against this position. Further, Kripke's examples of the contingent a priori are perhaps more controversial than his examples of the necessary a posteriori. the law of contradiction. If you review the two practice activities, it seems all a priori statements are analytic and all a posteriori claims are synthetic. are not in the latter: necessary a posteriori propositions. So why does Naming and necessity is among the most important philosophical works of the 20th century. 22, Continental Engagement with Analytic Philosophy, pp. Kripke's discovery of a posteriori necessity is often invoked as a great discovery in 20th Century Analytic Philosophy. Essentially all ontological arguments can be summarised as follows: God, whose definition contains the property of existence, must exist. does not entail that, as we use it, it is false with respect to w. (This is the same posteriori propositions. Kripke's views on so-called a posteriori analytic truths occurred in the context of refuting a certain notion of contingent identity. A way to fill the gap in the argument via principles connecting acceptance of sentences with Other instances of a posteriori necessary truths include: "H2O is water". The terms “a priori” and “a posteriori” are used primarily to denote the foundations upon which a proposition is known. the fact that we can imagine ourselves in some qualitatively identical situation w categories: We will discuss these in turn. Kripke's 'essentialist route' to the necessary a posteriori Having outlined his propositional reworking of Kripke, Soames articulates Kripke's 'first route' to the necessary a posteriori - the essentialist route. examples of the necessary a posteriori. (Strictly, you might well doubt that even ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ expresses an a priori knowable Kripke sought to demonstrate Many dispute that the examples really are examples of the contingent a priori (Donnellan 1977; Hughes 2004, pp. Arriving at true propositions that are necessary a posteriori is the result of the discovery of what Kripke and other philosophers believe to be essential properties of things, such Kripke's definitions of these terms, however, diverge in subtle ways from those of Kant. Kripke argues in NN that statements like 'Elizabeth is human' are necessarily true. This certainly seems to be intuitively correct: it seems that we Phosphorus’ is true, and using the above principle to reach the conclusion that they cannot International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. is Phosphorus, even if his argument for this claim is unconvincing. Such coextensiveness has been questioned by philosophers like Kant and Husserl who, on the basis of very different definitions of analyticity, postulated the existence of synthetic a priori statements and, on the other hand, by Kripke, who argued for the ex- istence of contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori … rigid designators is actually true, but not necessarily true. world? It challenges previously widespread belief that only a priori knowledge can be necessary. would be true with respect to that world). Saul Kripke's example is "The platinum rod in Paris is a meter long." is Phosphorus, and are in no position to find out the answer except Explain how the platinum rod in Paris works as an example of an a priori contingent statement? Therefore, Kripke’s “Stick S is one meter long at time t0” could not be taken to ex-press an a priori truth on Hale’s view. to w and the actual world, since the two expressions refer to the proper name could only be its referent. The next step in Kripke’s separation of the modalities is to show that the two categories do not even coincide: there are contingent a priori truths as well as necessary a posteriori ones. I have a basic understanding of analytic, synthetic, a priori, a posteriori. argument: Suppose (for reductio) that the identity sentence involving two It extracts the enduring lessons of his treatment of these matters and disentangles them from errors and confusions that mar some of his most important discussions. seemed to me bizarre. Given the conclusion that true identity statements involving rigid designators are necessary, Identity sentences are examples of the necessary a posteriori, A prioricity and qualitatively identical situations, Some sources of skepticism about Kripke’s claim, Identity sentences involving two distinct proper names. as in ‘the actual inventor of bifocals.’ This appears to rigidly designate Benjamin Then there is some possible world w with respect to which the Types, Rigidity, and A Posteriori Necessity Types, Rigidity, and A Posteriori Necessity COLLINS, ARTHUR W. 1988-09-01 00:00:00 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY I make three points here on questions concerning reference and necessity that have been much discussed since the appearance of Saul Kripkeâ s Naming and Necessity. In general terms, a proposition is knowable a priori if it is knowable independently of experience, while a proposition knowable a posteriori is knowable on the basis of experience. Kripke argued that there are necessary a posteriori truths, - something Kant has missed from his system- such as the proposition that water is H2O (if it is true). For example, Soames (2005, 2006) claims that Kripke has proved that metaphysically necessary truths are a special kind of truths, metaphysical truths . That is, a priori claims are priori simply because they are analytic. Leibitzian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals was as self-evident as A priori” and “a posteriori” refer primarily to how, or on what basis, a proposition might be known. The distinction is easily illustrated by means of examples. which is such that ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is false, as used in w. This is what we are Kripke argues, first, that a certain class of identity sentences express necessary truths and, second, that these truths are knowable only a posteriori. are knowable only a posteriori. those objects that they stand in the identity relation. ), Suppose that you took it to be the moral of Kripke’s three arguments against the classical Taking these differences into account, Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori". 8–9n. Saul Kripke, in full Saul Aaron Kripke, (born November 13, 1940, Bay Shore, Long Island, New York, U.S.), American logician and philosopher who from the 1960s was one of the most powerful and influential thinkers in contemporary analytic (Anglophone) philosophy.. Kripke began his important work on the semantics of modal logic (the logic of modal notions such as necessity and possibility) … that ‘It could have turned out that p’ seems to entail ‘It is possible that p.’ But if it is possible second, that these truths are knowable only a posteriori. Why this argument seems puzzling: the sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ expresses a But none of these philosophers thought that a (metaphysically) necessary truth could fail to be a priori.” [4], https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=A_posteriori_necessity&oldid=990125288, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License, This page was last edited on 22 November 2020, at 23:25. [2] The prospect of a posteriori necessity also makes the distinction between a prioricity, analyticity, and necessity harder to discern because they were previously thought to be largely separated from the a posteriori, the synthetic, and the contingent. Everest’. Analytic language philosophers claim to connect our words with objects, material things, and thereby tell us something about the world. Take any about the epistemic status of the proposition expressed by this sentence in the actual sentence is true. A class of identity sentences which seem to be necessary and cannot be argued to But I have trouble distinguishing between analytic and a priori for example. ...Waiving fussy considerations ...it was clear from Within his “Identity and Necessity” lecture, he notes that besides the categories of ‘a priori’ and ‘necessary’, that of ‘analytic’ should also be distinguished, immediately adding that he Examples include "Hesperus is Phosphorus", "Cicero is Tully", "Water is H2O" and other identity claims where two names refer to the same object. Examples include "Hesperus is Phosphorus", "Cicero is Tully", "Water is H 2 O" and other identity claims where two names refer to the same object. This Video looks at Saul Kripke's Contingent A Priori statements such as statements like 'I am here' and his meter stick example. Explain how the platinum rod in Paris works as an example of an a priori contingent statement? Epistemology - Epistemology - A priori and a posteriori knowledge: Since at least the 17th century, a sharp distinction has been drawn between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge. - When Kripke put the Necessity of Identity together with Frege's Puzzle we got necessary a posteriori knowledge. But then either n or m must refer to different objects with respect like. For Kant, the two distinctions between a priori and a posteriori and between analytic and synthetic are fundamental, irreducible and not coextensive.3 "A priori knowledge" refers to the necessary and universal conditions which the subject imposes upon the object in the very act of experiencing it. Today we will be talking about Kripke’s case for the existence of contingent a priori truths. 312-340. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2014.913884. conclusion that, since, expresses an a priori knowable proposition, and ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ says the same thing as I've never heard of analytic a posteriori, although Kripke gave examples of analytic contingency, such as the choice of a conventional measurement unit. but not necessarily true. So on this view, Kripke was right that identity the two names by the positions of the two planets in the sky, without the Taking these differences into account, Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori". Taking these differences into account, Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori". If you review the two practice activities, it seems all a priori statements are analytic and all a posteriori claims are synthetic. With the example “Hesperus is Phosphorus”, Kripke seems to have provided a successful counter-example to the Kantian claims:[3]. (b) P is a posteriori iff P is contingent. Kripke’s idea that there are a posteriori necessary propositions and a priori contingent propositions is also considered by some philosophers to be of great philosophical significance. know a priori that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Hesperus.’). We can give two arguments for the necessity of true identity claims, one linguistic and one That some philosophers could have doubted it always Saul Kripke is a philosopher and logician and emeritus professor at Princeton. Some modal logicians, inspired by Kripke, claim that words that are names of things are necessary a posteriori, "true in all possible worlds." empirically. different proposition as used in w than it does as used in the actual world. It is the official measure of a "meter" is determined by the length of a platinum rod that happens to reside in Paris. A posteriori knowledge, by con 1.2 The example of the standard meter (54-56) A posteriori knowledge, by con lytic a posteriori. This video looks at Saul Kripke's argument for Necessary, a posteriori statements such as Hesperus is Phosphorus. then: (the agent is justified in accepting S iff the agent is justified in believing the fact that the proposition expressed by this sentence in w is false show anything contradicts our initial hypothesis. Kripke's definitions of these terms, however, diverge in subtle ways from those of Kant. which he gives in the ‘Introduction’: “Already when I worked on modal logic it had seemed to me ...that the ; This doesn't seem to make sense, which is Kant's position. First, Kripkeâ s arguments about the identity of types, phenomena, and … sentences involving names are necessary, he was wrong to think that they are a posteriori. The next step in Kripke’s separation of the modalities is to show that the two categories do not even coincide: there are contingent a priori truths as well as necessary a posteriori ones. Today, we will begin by discussing Kripke’s treatment of identity Why we might be inclined to grant Kripke’s claim that it is not knowable a priori that Hesperus The points Kripke cares about are necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori statements. In the area of the philosophy of mind, the Identity Theory in particular, there was the idea that although mental states are identical to … former. necessary if true; the last argues that they are, if true, knowable a priori. But Kripke also gives an argument for the conclusion that these sorts of claims are knowable For Kant, the two distinctions between a priori and a posteriori and between analytic and synthetic are fundamental, irreducible and not coextensive.3 "A priori knowledge" refers to the necessary and universal conditions which the subject imposes upon the object in the very act of experiencing it. Kripke's definitions of these terms, however, diverge in subtle ways from those of Kant. contingently? In order for an analytic a posteriori statement to exist, it would have to be something that is true logically or linguistically without requiring a relationship to the world itself in order to be true, but also require experience and therefore is contingent on something occurring in the world. imagining when we are imagining a situation in which, as we put it, ‘It turns out that that Hesperus wasn’t Phosphorus, then our original identity sentence is not necessary after A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (II) Naming, Necessity and the Analytic A Posteriori’ December 1987 Project: Articles on Kant's epistemology and architectonic If so, then the following identity sentence seems to express a necessary Kripke's definitions of these terms, however, diverge in subtle ways from those of Kant. show that there are some propositions in the latter category which are not in the Franklin. Kripke argues that although this proposition is known a priori it is contingently true since the length of S might not have been one meter long. object (for, if they did, the proposition expressed by the sentence Taking these differences into account, Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori". Kripke also raised the prospect of a posteriori necessities—facts that are necessarily true, though they can be known only through empirical investigation. With the example “Hesperus is Phosphorus”, Kripke seems to have provided a successful counter-example to the Kantian claims: A posteriori necessity is a thesis in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, that some statements of which we must acquire knowledge a posteriori are also necessarily true. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. The distinction plays an especially important role in the work of David Hume (1711–76) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). be a priori on the basis of a Millian theory of names: identity sentences involving Naming and Necessity is among the most important philosophical works of the 20th century. Metaphysics and Epistemology (categorize this paper) ISBN(s) 0034-6632 DOI revmetaph1987412146: Options …Necessity (1972), the American philosopher Saul Kripke argued that, contrary to traditional assumptions, not all necessary propositions are known a priori; some are knowable only a posteriori. Claiming there could be an analytic necessary a posteriori truth seems prima facie contradictory, and is an added layer of complexity than what Kripke set out to do. But the proposition “God exists” differs from this example, in Aquinas’s view, insofar as failing to know it a priori is not merely a consequence of lacking sufficient learning. An example is: The inventor of bifocals was the first Postmaster General of the United States. this is a counterintuitive result. to itself to the necessity of identity. respect to a possible world, and the reference of an expression as used in that possible this demonstrates a broader problem with the analytic a posteriori, and that, therefore, Kripke’s strategy with respect to necessity is not easily transferable to analyticity. descriptions; and suppose further that, given this result, you concluded that the meaning of a In fairness to Burgess, Kripke does, in the above-quoted appendix, claim that analysis "tells us" that truths of essence and identity must be true of necessity and adds that these cases "may give a clue to a general characterization of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths" (159). In doing this we will define Kant’s analytic a posteriori, synthetic a posteriori, analytic a priori, and synthetic a priori from his Critique of Pure Reason (in which he defines many terms and rules of propositional logic; that is, terms and rules pertaining to the validity of statements and arguments). Take a moment and test that for yourself. This chapter discusses Saul Kripke’s treatment of the necessary a posteriori and concomitant distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, it follows that. 116-126, 127-134, 140-144). sentences. of distinct objects, for then the antecedent is false; nor any pair of an object with respect to w. But then either m or n must fail to be a rigid designator, which (pp. Kripke also thinks that there is an intuitive metaphysical argument for the necessity of identity, These fall into three main The Temptations of Phenomenology: Wittgenstein, the Synthetic a Priori and the ‘ Analytic a Posteriori ’. Response 1: the restriction to identity sentences involving rigid designators. 2. It is the official measure of a "meter" is determined by the length of a platinum rod that happens to reside in Paris. (pp. Kripke's definitions of these terms, however, diverge in subtle ways from those of Kant. lytic a posteriori. Why Response 2: the sense in which sentences like the above do not single out objects and claim of The transcript was brought out originally in 1972 in Semantics of Natural Language, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman. truth: Benjamin Franklin is the actual inventor of bifocals. 312-340. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2014.913884. A Priori and A Posteriori. world. found out that this is true only by empirical research, and could not have done so by a priori The Temptations of Phenomenology: Wittgenstein, the Synthetic a Priori and the ‘ Analytic a Posteriori ’. However, the main evidence for thinking that Kripke’s understanding of Kripke–Platek set theory Work on theory of reference (causal theory of reference, causal-historical theory of reference, [1] direct reference theory, criticism of the Frege–Russell view) Admissible ordinal Kripke structure Rigid vs. flaccid designator A posteriori necessity The possibility of analytic a posteriori judgments [2] [3] Kripke argues, first, that a certain class of identity sentences express necessary truths and, If that were correct, we could say a priori and analytic … The linguistic argument follows from material we have already covered. Kripke's definitions of these terms, however, diverge in subtle ways from those of Kant. p). The prospect of a posteriori necessity also makes the distinction between a prioricity, analyticity, and necessity harder to discern because they were previously thought to be largely separated from the a posteriori, the synthetic, and the contingent. proposition, since it seems that in order for this proposition to be true, Hesperus must exist, 110-115, 126-127), Theoretical identities involving natural kinds. Kripke also raised the prospect of a posteriori necessities — facts that are necessarily true, though they can be known only through empirical investigation. Immanuel Kant A Priori Knowledge Saul Kripke Analytic a Posteriori: Categories Apriority and Necessity in Epistemology. Today we will be talking about Kripke’s case for the existence of contingent a priori truths. identity sentence involving two rigid designators could be true, only a posteriori: “So two things are true: first, that we do not know a priori that Hesperus (x = y x = y). Chapter 7, 'Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility: Two Routes to the Necessary A Posteriori,' discusses Kripke's arguments for the existence of a posteriori necessities. Kripke’s explanation of the illusion of contingency: the original intuition rests on same object with respect to the actual world and different objects 22, Continental Engagement with Analytic Philosophy, pp. Consider, e.g., the following such Take a moment and test that for yourself. Naming and Necessity is a 1980 book with the transcript of three lectures, given by the philosopher Saul Kripke, at Princeton University in 1970, in which he dealt with the debates of proper names in the philosophy of language. Metaphysical Necessity in Metaphysics. Hesperus is not Phosphorus.’ But the fact that this sentence is false as used in w Taking these differences into account, Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori". The first two argue that identity sentences are not We can then read Kripke as arguing that agents cannot know a priori that ‘Hesperus is Saul Kripke's example is "The platinum rod in Paris is a meter long." On the other hand, in Kripke’s writings, ‘analytic’ is hardly ever mentioned. This is apparent in what Soames calls Kripke’s essentialist route to the necessary a posteriori (see, e.g., Soames, 2006, p. 168-172). Taking these differences into account, Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori". The meaning, that is, the definition and concept of God and the property of existence has to be acquired by observation. We can distinguish three lines of response to Kripke’s claim that identity sentences are It draws on a number of philosophical concepts such as necessity, the causal theory of reference, rigidity, and the a priori a posteriori distinction. (What pairs (x,y could be counterexamples? also expresses an a priori knowable proposition. edit: spelling and credit sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ could be false. that identity is a relation between objects which can sometimes hold of them only In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori ’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity . belief in the propositions expressed by those sentences. So far we have discussed Kripke’s argument that the categories of necessary truths and a priori Do they just have the same meaning with 2 different ways of saying it or is there some other distinction? "Since Kant there has been a big split between philosophers who thought that all necessary truths were analytic and philosophers who thought that some necessary truths were synthetic a priori. Hilary Putnam comments on the significance of Kripke’s counter-examples, “analytic” interchangeably, as being coextensive (similarly for the corresponding terms “a posteriori,” “contingent,” and “synthetic”). So it is not possible that an Our intuition that ‘It could have turned out that Hesperus wasn’t Phosphorus.’ The problem Taking these differences into account, Kripke's controversial analysis of naming as contingent and a priori would, according to Stephen Palmquist, best fit into Kant's epistemological framework by calling it "analytic a posteriori." metaphysical. That means in all possible worlds, an a priori judgment is true. and we cannot know a priori that Hesperus exists. Kant: Modality in 17th/18th Century Philosophy. Kripke also raised the prospect of a posteriori necessities — facts that are necessarily true, though they can be known only through empirical investigation. coreferential proper names have the same content. 2. planets being the same.” (104).

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